A. 6

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Page 1
             HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX
2
           UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
3
            SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
5
    In Re:
6
                                Chapter 11
    LEHMAN BROTHERS
                               Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
    HOLDINGS, INC., et al., (Jointly Administered)
8
                    Debtors.
10
     _____X
11
12
             * * *HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL* * *
13
             DEPOSITION OF ARCHIBALD COX
14
                   New York, New York
15
                   September 11, 2009
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
    Reported by:
24
    KATHY S. KLEPFER, RMR, RPR, CRR, CLR
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    JOB NO. 24300
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	Page 2	Page
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 13 14 15 6 17 8 9 10 11 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX September 11, 2009 10:19 a.m. HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL deposition of ARCHIBALD COX, held at the law offices of Jones Day, LLP, 222 East 41st Street, New York, New York, before Kathy S. Klepfer, a Registered Professional Reporter, Registered Merit Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, Certified Livenote Reporter, and Notary Public of the State of New York.	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A P P E A R A N C E S: JONES DAY, LLP Attorneys for Lehman Brothers, Inc. 222 East 41st Street New York, New York 10017-6702 BY: JAYANT W. TAMBE, ESQ. BART GREEN, ESQ. BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP Attorneys for Barclays and the Witness 575 Lexington Avenue - 7th Floor New York, New York 10022 BY: JACK G. STERN, ESQ. BY: JACK G. STERN, ESQ. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-958
13		
1 2 3 4 5	Page 4 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A PPEARANCES: (Cont'd.) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP Attorneys for the Examiner 330 N. Wabash Avenue	Page 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Chicago, Illinois 60611-7603 BY: VINCENT LAZAR, ESQ. QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART, OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP Attorneys for the Creditors Committee 51 Madison Avenue 22nd Floor New York, New York 10010 BY: JAMES C. TECCE, ESQ. HUGHES, HUBBARD & REED, LLP Attorneys for the SIPA Trustee 1775 I Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006-2401 BY: JOHN WOOD, ESQ. FARA TABATABAI, ESQ. (Afternoon Session) Also Present: PHILIP E. KRUSE, Alvarez & Marsal G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	REDACTED

PAGES 6 – 49 REDACTED

i	Page 50		Page 51
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX
2	1	2	marked for identification, as of this date.)
3		3	Q. I've handed you a three-page document
4		4	marked 417B. Take moment to review all three
5		5	pages. Let me know when you're done.
6	l	6	(Document review.)
7		7	A. All right.
8		8	Q. There's various handwriting on all
9		9	three pages. Some of the handwriting is yours,
10	REDACTED	10	correct?
11	NEVANIAV	11	A. Some of it is mine. On two of the
12		12	pages, some of it's mine.
13		13	Q. On the middle page the handwriting
14		14	that appears, that's not your handwriting at
15		15	all, correct?
16		16	A. That's correct.
17		17	Q. So, putting aside that handwriting,
18		18	which also shows up on the first page, the
19		19	handwriting on the right-hand side of the page
20		20	on the first page?
21		21	A. Yes.
22		22	Q. If you could help us understand what
23		23	you have written there?
24	(Exhibit 417B, a document bearing	24	A. I can read it to you.
25	Bates Nos. BCI-EX-115898 through 115900,	25	Q. Yes, if you could, and then I'll ask
	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	3	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
12	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9360	150	s Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9380
	Page 52		Page 53
1		1	
_	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX
2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX you some follow-up questions about it.	1 2	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX the 15th?
2 3		8	
	you some follow-up questions about it.	2	the 15th?
3	you some follow-up questions about it. A. "We need these contracts. No one	2 3	the 15th? A. I do not remember specifically.
3 4	you some follow-up questions about it. A. "We need these contracts. No one knows where the 800 million came from. The 200	2 3 4	the 15th? A. I do not remember specifically. Q. Do you see the typewritten information
3 4 5	you some follow-up questions about it. A. "We need these contracts. No one knows where the 800 million came from. The 200 million is for more than 3,000 contracts.	2 3 4 5	the 15th? A. I do not remember specifically. Q. Do you see the typewritten information on page 1 of Exhibit 417B has a line that reads,
3 4 5 6	you some follow-up questions about it. A. "We need these contracts. No one knows where the 800 million came from. The 200 million is for more than 3,000 contracts. Mission critical." And then, "How big will this number be? 200 million estimated for more than	2 3 4 5 6	the 15th? A. I do not remember specifically. Q. Do you see the typewritten information on page 1 of Exhibit 417B has a line that reads, "Cure PMT," payment; do you see that?
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	Page 54		Page 5		
1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX	1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX		
2			the total of the two items, two separate		
3	Q. There's a reference to the 800		categories above.		
4	million, the \$800 million in your handwritten		Q. Do you know whether that number		
5	notes, do you see that?		reflected any markdown of asset values?		
6	A. Yes.	6	A. I assume that that number reflected		
7	Q. Do you know what that's a reference	7	I do not I assume that number reflected the		
8	to?	8	marks that were agreed to between the two		
9	A. No.	9	parties.		
0	Q. The typewritten version, the	10	Q. And that's the process you had		
1	typewritten information that appears on this	11	referred to before?		
2	document, do you know what that is?	12	A. Yes.		
3	A. That was, at that particular point in	13	Q. Do you know whether that number is the		
1	time that it was put together, was the was	14	same number at which those assets were carried		
5	the list of assets and liabilities that Barclays	15	on Lehman's books on or about September 16,		
5					
7	you want to	16 17	A. I do not know exactly. I do not know		
3	Q. In the "Assets" column, at the bottom	18			
)	of the "Assets" column, there's a typewritten	19	therefore, if it was the same number or not. I		
)	entry, "80J, adjusted total assets, 72.65," do	20	do know that some of their marks were higher		
	you see that?	21	than ours, some of their marks would have been		
2	A. Yes.	22	lower than ours. I think there was a good faith		
3	Q. Do you know how that number was	23	agreement between the parties what the marks		
1	derived?	24	should be.		
5	A. That's I guess that was the sum of	25	Q. Do you know any of the individuals who		
J	A. That's I guess that was the sum of		Q. Do you know any or the marviadate who		
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	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	TS	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-958		
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ΓS		TS(G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-958 Page ! HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX		
	Page 56 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX	<u> </u>	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-958 Page S		
TS L 2	Page 56	1	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-958 Page 5 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX		
TS L 2	Page 56 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX were involved in reaching that good faith agreement as to what the marks should be?	1 2	Page 5 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A. And presumably a bunch of other people		
IS L 2 3	Page 56 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX were involved in reaching that good faith agreement as to what the marks should be? A. I do not know well, I do not know	1 2 3	Page 5 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A. And presumably a bunch of other people as well, because these are all different trading books. Q. Do you have any idea as to		
IS L 2 3 4	Page 56 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX were involved in reaching that good faith agreement as to what the marks should be? A. I do not know well, I do not know specifically all the people who would have been	1 2 3 4	Page ! HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A. And presumably a bunch of other people as well, because these are all different trading books.		
TS L 2 3 4 5	Page 56 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX were involved in reaching that good faith agreement as to what the marks should be? A. I do not know well, I do not know specifically all the people who would have been involved because there would have been a large	1 2 3 4 5	Page ! HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A. And presumably a bunch of other people as well, because these are all different trading books. Q. Do you have any idea as to		
IS L 2 3 4 5 6 7	Page 56 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX were involved in reaching that good faith agreement as to what the marks should be? A. I do not know well, I do not know specifically all the people who would have been involved because there would have been a large number of people involved given all the	1 2 3 4 5 6	Page 5 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX A. And presumably a bunch of other people as well, because these are all different trading books. Q. Do you have any idea as to mechanically how the marking was done? Was it		
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Page 59 Page 58 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX 1 1 2 Q. What's that a reference to? 2 estimate of? A. No. No. No. Working with Lehman. 3 3 A. Both of the notes on this page or all 4 Because obviously they had accrued numbers on 4 the notes on this page relate to questions I had 5 about the cure payment and the compensation 5 their books. They had some facts we didn't liability pool that we were assuming, in that I 6 6 7 Q. So your belief is that the \$2 billion 7 wanted to make sure that we were not overstating 8 8 or understating the numbers. number was the number accrued on Lehman's books? 9 MR. STERN: Objection to the form. The notes you have specifically 9 10 A. I did not say that. 10 referred to came about as a result of looking at 111 Q. That's what I'm trying to understand. 11 the 2 billion accrual number that we had for the A. That's not what I said. I said 12 comp -- potential liability number that we had 12 13 13 they -- we had to do it with them. They had for the comp, compensation, and I do not -- my 14 notes are not full. I do not remember exactly some numbers that were accrued on their books. 15 what the 1.35 billion was, whether that referred 15 They had -- they knew what they were going --16 they knew what approximately their liability to just the U.S. entity or whether it referred 17 17 to what they had accrued on their books so far would be for the year that they thought they had 18 to pay. We obviously had to be working with 18 for cash payments but excluding their 19 Lehman to come up with a number that was arrived 19 compensation paid in stock. I do not remember. I think what I was 20 20 Q. Do you know whether 2 billion was the satisfied with was that the 2 billion number was 21 21 22 number that Lehman had accrued on its books? 22 as accurate a number as we could come up with. Q. When you say "as accurate a number as 23 A. Well, first of all, I don't believe 23 24 that it was because the 2 billion number applied 24 you could come up with," was that \$2 billion 25 to a year and they would only have accrued for number a number that Barclays was generating an TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 61 Page 60 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX 1 2 the \$2 billion number would be questionable? 2 through the end of August, so for only for A. The 1.35 billion. 3 3 two-thirds of the year. So it's highly unlikely that they 4 Q. Did you ask Rich Ricci questions about 4 5 would have had a full year's accrual in eight 5 how he came up with that number? A. Yes. We asked -- we asked a lot of 6 6 months given the environment in which we were 7 questions about this. That's why I say when we 7 operating. Secondly, I don't know that they ended up with the \$2 billion number, that was 8 accrued for the stock portion of their 8 the number that we felt was the correct number. 9 compensation. They may have only been accruing 10 O. Do you know the amount of the comp 10 for the cash portion of their compensation. payments that Barclays has made under the So I would think it highly unlikely 11 1.1 12 contract, under the Asset Purchase Agreement? that the 2 billion number was accrued on their 13 A. I don't know the exact number, but my 13 books at that time. understanding is it's somewhere in that area of 14 Q. Did you ever see any calculations from 14 15 Lehman of their accruals? 15 2 billion. A. Did I ever see their actual books and 16 Q. How do you have that understanding? 16 From what I've been told. 17 records that showed that number? 17 Q. By counsel? Q. Yes. 18 18 19 A. No. Internally. A. No. What their accrual was, no. O. By whom? 20 The 1.35 billion number Rich came up with, what's that a reference to? A. I don't recall. 21 Q. If you look at the last page of this A. Rich Ricci had -- the 1.35 billion is 22 22 23 exhibit, 417B, I believe that's your handwriting the number that Rich gave me. on the right-hand side, correct? Q. You said "may be questionable." Is A. I think we've covered that. 25 that Rich's number that will be questionable or TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX 2 Q. So next to the word "cure payment" in 3 the amount 2.25, you have written, "How big will 4 this number be? Is Lehman expecting this? 5 Creditors." Do you see that? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. What's your reference to creditors 8 there?	Page 63 1 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX
9 A. It's are the creditors expecting a number this big. 11 Q. Are these questions that you posed to Lehman? 13 A. They're questions that I asked of myself. I would I do not remember specifically asking people, others, but logical to assume I did.	REDACTED
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1	HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - A. COX				
2	CERTIFICATE				
3 ST A	ATE OF NEW YORK) : ss				
4 CO	OUNTY OF NEW YORK)				
5	I, Kathy S. Klepfer, a Registered				
	rit Reporter and Notary Public within and the State of New York, do hereby				
8 cert	tify:				
	That ARCHIBALD COX, the witness whose position is herein before set forth, was	9			
11 duly	y sworn by me and that such deposition is				
12 atm	rue record of the testimony given by such		,		
14	I further certify that I am not		'		
	ated to any of the parties to this action		'		
16 by l 17 inte	blood or marriage and that I am in no way erested in the outcome of this matter.		1		
18	I further certify that neither the				
	ponent nor a party requested a review of transcript pursuant to Federal Rule of				
21 Civ	vil Procedure 30(e) before the deposition				
	s completed. In witness whereof, I have hereunto		1		
	my hand this 11th day of September,				
24 200					
25 mcc Per	Abbina Wanlahia (077) 7	02_0500			
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